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tv   Key Capitol Hill Hearings  CSPAN  December 9, 2014 12:00pm-2:01pm EST

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false information, diverting resources and leading officers or contractors to falsely believe they were acquiring unique or actionable intelligence and that its interrogations were working when they were not. internally, c.i.a. officers often called into question the effectiveness of the c.i.a.'s interrogation techniques, noting how the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate information. the report includes numerous examples of c.i.a. officers questioning the agency's claims, but these contradictions were marginalized and not presented externally. the second set of findings and conclusions is that the c.i.a. provided extensive inaccurate
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information about the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the c.i.a. inspector general, the media, and the american public. this conclusion is somewhat personal for me. i remember clearly when director hayden briefed the intelligence committee for the first time on the so-called e.i.t.'s at that september, 2006 committee meeting. he referred specifically to a -- quote -- "actually slap" -- end quote among other techniques and presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful and implied in a highly clinical and professional manner. they were not. the committee's report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful and that the constraints that existed on paper in
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washington did not match the way techniques were used at c.i.a. sites around the world. a particular -- of particular note was the treatment of abu zubaydah over the span of 17 days in august of 2002. this involved nonstop interrogation and abuse, 24/7, from august 4 to august 21, and included multiple forms of deprivation and physical assault. the description of this period first written up by our staff in early 2009 while senator rockefeller was chairman, is what prompted this full review. but the inaccurate and incomplete descriptions go far beyond that. the c.i.a. provided inaccurate memoranda and explanations to the department of justice while
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its legal counsel was considering the legality of the coercive techniques. in those communications to the department of justice, the c.i.a. claimed the following -- the coercive techniques would not be used with excessive repetition, detainees would always have an opportunity to provide information prior to the use of the techniques. the techniques were to be used in progression starting with the least aggressive and proceeding only if needed. medical personnel would make sure that interrogations wouldn't cause serious harm and they could interview at any time to stop interrogations. interrogators were carefully vetted and highly trained. and each technique was to be used in a specific way without deviation and only with specific
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approval for the interrogator and detainee involved. none of these assurances which the department of justice relied on to form its legal opinions were consistently or even routinely carried out. in many cases, important information was with withheld from policymakers. for example, foreign intelligence committee chairman bob graham asked a number of questions after he was first briefed in september of 2002, but the c.i.a. refused to answer him, effectively stonewalling him until he left the committee at the end of the year. in another example, the c.i.a. in coordination with white house officials and staff initially withheld information of the -- withheld information of the c.i.a.'s interrogation techniques from secretary of
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state colin powell and secretary of defense donald rumsfeld. there are c.i.a. records stating that colin powell wasn't told about the program at first because there were concerns that -- and i quote -- "powell would blow his stack if he were briefed." source, email from john rizzo dated july 31, 2003. c.i.a. records clearly indicate and definitively that after he was briefed on the detainee abu grab you'da the c.i.a. didn't tell president bush about the full nature of the e.i.t.'s until april of 2006. that's what the records indicate. the c.i.a. similar withheld information or provided false information to the c.i.a. inspector general during his conduct of a special review by
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the i.g. in 2004. incomplete and inaccurate information from the c.i.a. was useed in documents provided to the department of justice and as a basis for president bush's speech on september 6, 2006, in which he publicly acknowledged the c.i.a. program for the first time. in all of these cases, other c.i.a. officers acknowledged internally -- they acknowledged internally that information the c.i.a. had provided was wrong. the c.i.a. also misled other c.i.a. white house officials. when vice president cheney's counsel, david addington, asked c.i.a. general scott mueller in 2003 about the c.i.a.'s video taping the waterboarding of detainees,
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mueller deliberately told him that videotapes -- quote -- "were not being made" -- end quote but did not disclose that videotapes of previous water word boarding sessions had been made and still existed. source, email from scott mueller dated june 7, 2003. there are many, many more examples in the committee's report. all are documented. the third set every findings and conclusions notes the various ways in which c.i.a. management of the detention and interrogation program from its inception to its formal termination in january of 2009 was inadequate and deeply flawed. there is no doubt that the detention and interrogation program was by any measure a major c.i.a. undertaking. it raised significant legal and policy issues, and involved significant resources and
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funding. it was not, however, managed as a significant c.i.a. program. instead, it had limited oversight and lacked formal direction and management. for example, in the six months between being granted detention authority and taking custody of its first detainee, abu zubaydah, the c.i.a. had not identified and prepared a suitable detention cite. it had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques outside of the rapport-building techniques that were official c.i.a. policy until that time. in fact, there is no indication the c.i.a. reviewed its own history. that's just what helgerson was saying in 2005, with coercive
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interrogation tactics. as the executive summary notes, the c.i.a. had engaged in rough interrogation in the past. in fact, the c.i.a. had previously sent a letter to the intelligence committee in 1989, and here is the quote -- "that inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers" -- end quote. that was a letter from john helgerson, c.i.a. director of congressional affairs, dated january 8, 1989. however, in late 2001 and 2002, rather than research interrogation practices and coordinate with other parts of the government with extensive expertise in detention and interrogation of terrorist
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attacks, the c.i.a. engaged two contract psychologists who had never conducted interrogations themselves or ever operated detention facilities. as the c.i.a. captured or received custody of detainees through 2002, it maintained separate lines of management at headquarters for different detention facilities. no individual or office was in charge of the detention and interrogation program until january of 2003, by which point more than one-third of c.i.a. detainees identified in our review had been detained and interrogated. one clear example of flawed c.i.a. management was the poorly managed detention facility referred to in our report by the
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code name cobalt to hide the actual name of the facility. it began operations in september of 2002. the facility knew few formal records -- excuse me, the facility kept few formal records of the detainees housed there, and untrained c.i.a. officers conducted frequent unauthorized and unsupervised interrogations, using techniques that were not and never became part of the c.i.a.'s formal enhanced interrogation program. the c.i.a. placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of the cite. in -- the site. in november, 2002, an otherwise healthy detainee who
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was held mostly nude and chained to the concrete floor died at the facility from what was believed to have been hypothermia. in interviews conducted in 2003 by the c.i.a. officer of the inspector general, c.i.a.'s leadership acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at this specific c.i.a. detention site, and some c.i.a. -- excuse me, senior officials believed erroneously that enhanceed interrogation techniques were not used there. the c.i.a. in its june, 2013 response to the committee's report agreed that there were management failure in the program, but asserted that they were corrected by early 2003. while the study found that management failures improved somewhat, we found they persisted till the end of the program. among the numerous management
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shortcomings identified in the report are the following -- the c.i.a. used poorly trained and nonvetted personnel. individuals were deployed, in particular interrogators, without relevant training or experience. due to the c.i.a.'s redactions to the report, there are limits to what i can say in this regard but it's a clear fact that the c.i.a. deployed officers who had histories of personal, ethical, and professional problems of a serious nature. these included histories of violence and abusive treatment of others, and should have called into question their employment with the united states government, let alone their suitability to partnership in a sense -- participate in a sensitive c.i.a. covert action program. the two contractors that c.i.a. allowed to develop, operate,
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and assess its interrogation operations conducted numerous inherently governmental functions that never should have been outsourced to contractors. these contractors are referred in the report in special pseudonyms, swag earth and dunbar. they developed the list of so-called enhanceed interrogation techniques that the c.i.a. employed. they personally conducted interrogations of some of the c.i.a.'s most significant detainees, using the techniques, including the waterboarding of abu zubaydah, khalid shekh mohammed and al-nashiri. the contractors provided the official evaluations of whether detainees' psychological states allowed for the continued use of the enhanceed techniques. even for some detainees, they themselves were interrogating or
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had interrogated.evaluating thel state of the very detainees they were interrogating is a clear conflict of interest and a violation of professional guidelines. the c.i.a. relied on these two contractors to evaluate the interrogation program they had devised and in which they had obvious financial interests; again, a clear conflict of interest and an avoidance of responsibility. by the c.i.a. in 2005, the two contractors formed a company specifically for the purpose of expanding their work with the c.i.a. from 2005 to 2008 the c.i.a. outsourced almost all aspects of its detention and interrogation program to this country as part of a contract valued at more than $180 million.
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ultimately, not all contract options were exercised. however, the c.i.a. has paid these two contractors and their company more than $80 million. of the 119 individuals found to have been detained by the c.i.a. during the life of the program, the committee found that at least 26 were wrongfully held. these are cases where the c.i.a. itself determined that it had not met the standard for detention set out in the 2001 memorandum of notification, which governs a covert action. detainees often remained in custody for months after the c.i.a. determined they should have been released. c.i.a. records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many
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other detainees. due to poor record keeping, a full accounting of how many specific detainees were held and how they were specifically treated while in custody may nevadnever be known. similarly, in specific instances, we found that enhanced interrogation techniques were used without authorization in a manner far ditch and more brutal -- different and more brutal than had been authorized by the office of legal counsel and ducted by personnel not approved to use them -- conducted by personnel not approved to use them on detainees. questions about how and when to apply interrogation techniques were ad hoc and not proposed, evaluated, and a. approved in the manner -- and approved in the manner described by the c.i.a. in i think weren descriptions and testimony about the program. detainees were often subject to harsh and brutal interrogation
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and treatment because c.i.a. analysts believe, often in error, that they knew more information than what they had provided. sometimes c.i.a. managers and interrogators in the field were uncomfortable with what they were being asked to do and recommended ending the abuse of a detainee. repeatedly in such cases, they were overruled by people at c.i.a. headquarters who thought they knew better, such as by analysts with no line authority. this shows again how a relatively small number of c.i.a. personnel -- perhaps 40 to 50 -- were making decisions on detention and interrogation despite the better judgments of other c.i.a. officers. the fourth and final set of findings and conclusions concern
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how the interrogations of c.i.a. detainees were absolutely brutal, far worse than the c.i.a. represented them to policy-makers and others. beginning with the first detainee, abu zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the s.d.i c.i.a. applied its sod enhanced intier ga interrogation techniques for days and weeks at a time on one detainee. in contrast, th to c.i.a. representations, detainees were subjected to the most aggressive techniques immediately -- stripped naked, diapered, physically struck and put in various physical stress positions for long periods of time. they were deprived of sleep for days. in one case up to 180 hours. that's 7 1/2 days over a week
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with no sleep, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands tied together over their heads chained to the ceiling. in the cobalt facility i previously mentioned, interrogators and guards use what had they called "rough take-downs" in which a detainees was grabbed from a cell, cleedges cut off, hooded, and dragged up and down a dirt hallway while being are slapped and pashed. the c.i.a. several detainees to believe that they would never be allowed to leave c.i.a. custody alive, suggesting to abu zubaydah that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box. that's c.i.a. cable from august 12, 2002. according to another c.i.a. cable, c.i.a. officers also planned to cremate abu zubaydah should he not survive his interrogation.
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source: c.i.a. cable july 15, 2002. after the use i the news, the ie committee held a hearing on the matter on may 12, 2004. without disclosing any details of its own interrogation program, c.i.a. director john mclaughlin testified that c.i.a. interrogations were nothing like what was depicted at abu ghraib, the united states prison in iraq where detainees were abused by american personnel. this, of course, was false. c.i.a. detaineeses at one facility described as a dungeon were kept in complete darkness, constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. the u.s. bureau of prisons personnel went to that location
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in november 2002 and according to a contefn rainious internal c.i.a. e-mail, told c.i.a. officers they had -- quote -- "never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived." end quote. again source: c.i.a. e-mail sender and recipient redacted, december 5, 2002. throughout the program, multiple c.i.a. detainees subject to interrogation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. multiple c.i.a. psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems. the executive summary includes
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far more detail than i'm going to provide here about things that were in these interrogation sessions, and the summary itself includes only a subset of the treatment of the 119 c.i.a. detainees. there is far more detail, all documented in the full 6,700-page study. this summarizes briefly the committee's findings and conclusions. before i wrap up, i'd like to thank the people who made this undertaking possible. first, i thank senator jay rockefeller. he started this project by directing his staff to review the operational cables that describe the first recorded interrogations after we learned that the videotapes of those sessions had been destroyed. and that report was what led to
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this multiyear investigation, and without it we wouldn't have really had any sense of what had happened. i thank other members of the senate intelligence committee, one of whom is on the floor today from the great state of new mexico. others have been on the floor -- who voted to conduct this investigation and to approve its result and make the report public. but most importantly, i want to thank the intelligence committee staff who performed this work. they are dedicated and committed public officials who sacrificed and really sacrificed a significant portion of their lives to see this report through to its publication. they have worked days, nights, weekends for years in some of the most difficult circumstances. it's no secret to anyone that the c.i.a. does not want this
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report coming out, and i believe the nation owes them a debt of gratitude. they are dan jones, who has led this review since 2007, and more than anyone else today is a result of his effort. evan godesman and tad turner, each wrote thousands of pages of the full report and have dedicated themselves and much of their lives to this project. elisa starszac, who began this as cohead and contributed extensively until her departure from the committee in 2011. other key contributors to the drafting, editing and review of the report were jennifer barrett, nick basiano, mike buckwald, jim katella, eric chapman, lor lorenzo goco, trecd
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genif, michael neblet, michael pezner, caroline tess and james wolf. and finally david granite, who has been a never-faltering staff director throughout this review. madam president, this study is bigger than the actions of the c.i.a. it's really about american values and more or less. it's about the constitution, the bill of rights, our rule of law. these values exist regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. they exist in peacetime and in wartime, and if we cast aside these values when convenient, we have failed to live by the very pre-septembers that -- pre-cepts that make our nation a great jaun. there is a r twhee carry the
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banner after great nation. so we submit this stud on behalf of the committee to the public in the belief that it will stand the test of time and with it the report will carry the message "never again." i very much appreciate your attention and i yield to senator mccain. mr. mccain: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: madam president, i would like to begin by expressing appreciation and admiration for the men and women who serve in our intelligence agencies, including the c.i.a. they are out there every day defending our nation. i have read the executive summary and i also have been briefed on the entirety of this report. i rise in support of the release, the long-delayed release of the senate intelligence committee's summarized, unclassified review of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were employed by the previous
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administration to extract information from captured terrorists. it's a thorough and thoughtful study of practices that i believe not only failed their purpose to secure actionable intelligence to prevent further attacks on the u.s. and our allies but actually damaged our security interests as well as our reputation as a force for good in the world. i believe the american people have a right -- indeed, responsibility -- to know what was done in their name, how these practices did or did not serve our interests, and how they comported with our most important values. i commend chairwoman feinstein and her staff for their diligence in seeking a truthful accounting of policies i hope we will never resort to again. i thank them for persevering against persistent opposition
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from many members of the intelligence community, from officials in two administrations, and from some of our colleagues. the truth is sometimes a hard pill to swallow. it sometimes causes us difficulties at home and abroad. it is sometimes used by our enemies in attempts to hurt us. but the american people are entitled to it, nonetheless. they must know when the values that define our nation are intentionally disregarded by our security policies, even those policies that are conducted in secret. they must be able to make informed judgments about whether those policies and the personnel who supported them were justified in compromising our values, whether they served a greater good, or whether, as i
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believe, they stained our national honor, did much harm and little practical good. what were the policies? what was their purpose? did they achieve it? did they make us safer? less safe? or did they make no difference? what did they gain us? what did they cost us? the american people need the answers to these questions. yes, some things must be kept from public disclosure to protect con destine operations, sources and methods, but not the answers to these questions. by providing them, the committee has empowered the american people to come to their own decisions about whether we should have employed such practices in the past and whether we should consider permitting them in the future. this report strengthens self-government and ultimately, i believe, america's security and stature in the world and i
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thank the committee for their valuable public service. i have long believed some of these practices amounted to torture as a reasonable person would define it, especially, but not only the practice of waterboarding, which is a mock execution and an exquisite form of torture. its use was shameful and unnecessary, and contrary to assertions made by some of its defenders, and as the committee's report makes clear, it produced little useful intelligence to help us track down the perpetrators of 9/11 or prevent new attacks and atrocities. i know from personal experience that the abuse of prisoners will produce more bad than good intelligence. i know that victims of torture will offer intentionally misleading information if they
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think their captors will believe it. i know they will say whatever they think their torturers want them to say if they believe it will stop their suffering. most of all, i know the use of torture compromises that which most distinguishes us from our enemies, our belief that all people, even captured enemies, possess basic human rights which are protected by international conventions the united states not only joined but for the most part authored. i will, too, that bad things happen in war. i know in war good people can feel obliged for good reasons to do things they would normally object to and recoil from. i understand the reasons that governed the decision to resort to these interrogation methods, and i know that those who approved them and those who used
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them were dedicated to securing justice for the victims of terrorist attacks and to protect americans from further harm. i know their responsibilities were grave and urgent, and the strain of their duty was onerous. i respect their dedication and appreciate their dilemma, but i dispute wholeheartedly that it was right for them to use these methods which this report makes clear were neither in the best interests of justice nor our security nor the ideals we have sacrificed so much blood and treasure to defend. the knowledge of torture's dubious efficacy and my moral objection to the abuse of prisoners motivated by sponsorship of the detainee treatment act of 2005, which prohibits -- quote -- "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of captured combatants whether
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they wear a nation's uniform or not and which passed the senate by the vote of 90-9. subsequently, i successfully offered amendments to the military commissions act of 2006 which among other things prevented the attempt to weaken common article 3 of the geneva conventions and broadened definitions in the war crimes act to make the future use of waterboarding and other -- quote -- "enhanced interrogation techniques" punishable as war crimes. there was considerable misinformation disseminated then about what was and wasn't achieved using these methods in an effort to encourage support for the legislation. there was a good amount of misinformation used in 2011 to credit the use of these methods with the death of osama bin laden and there is, i fear, misinformation being used today to prevent the release of this report disputing its findings
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and warning about the security consequences of their public disclosure. with the report's release, will -- will the report's release cause outrage that leads to violence in some parts of the muslim world? yes, i suppose that's possible. perhaps likely. sadly, violence needs little incentive in some quarters of the world today. but that doesn't mean we will be telling the world something it will be shocked to learn. the entire world already knows that we water boarded prisoners. it knows that we subjected prisoners various other types of degrading treatment. it knows we used black sites, secret prisons. those practices haven't been a secret for a decade. terrorists might use the report's reidentification of the practices as an excuse to attack americans, but they hardly need
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an excuse for that. that has been their life's calling for a while now. what might come as a surprise not just to our enemies but to many americans is how little these practices did to aid our efforts to bring 9/11 culprits to justice and to find and prevent terrorist attacks today and tomorrow. that could be a real surprise, since it contradicts the many assurances provided by intelligence officials on the record and in private that enhanceed interrogation techniques were indispensable in the war against terrorism. and i suspect the objection of those same officials to the release of this report is really focused on that disclosure, torture's ineffectiveness. because we gave up much in the expectation that torture would make us safer. too much. obviously, we need intelligence to defeat our enemies but we
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need reliable intelligence. torture produces more misleading information than actionable intelligence. and what the advocates of harsh and interrogation methods have never established is that we couldn't have gathered as good or more reliable intelligence from using humane methods. the most important -- the most important lead we got came from using conventional interrogation methods and i think it's an insult to the many intelligence officers who have acquired good intelligence without hurting or degrading prisoners to assert we can't win this war without such methods. yes, we can and we will. but in the end, torture's failure to serve its intended purpose isn't the main reason to oppose its use. i have often said and will always maintain that this question isn't about our names,
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it's about us. it's about how we were, who we are, and who we aspire to be. it's about how we represent ourselves to the world. we have made our way in this often dangerous and cruel world not by just strictly pursuing our geopolitical interests but by exemplifying our political values and influencing other nations to embrace them. when we fight to defend our security, we fight also for an idea, not for a tribe or a twisted interpretation of aonian gent religion or a king but for an idea that all men are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights. how much safer the world would be if all nations believes the same. how much more dangerous it can become when we forget it ourselves, even momentarily.
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our enemies act without conscience. we must not. this executive summary of the committee's report makes clear that acting without conscience isn't necessary. it isn't even helpful in winning this strange and long war we're fighting. we should be grateful to have that truth affirmed. now let us reassert the temporary proposition that it is essential to our success in this war that we ask those who fight it for us to remember at all times that they are defending a sacred ideal of how nations should be governed and conduct their relations with others, even our enemies. those of us who give them this duty are obliged by history, by our nation's highest ideals and the many terrible sacrifices
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made to protect them by our respect for human dignity, to make clear we need be risk our national honor to prevail in this or any war. we need only remember in the worst of times through the chaos and terror of war, when facing cruelty, suffering, and loss, that we are always americans and different, stronger, and better than those who would destroy us. madam president, i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from west virginia. mr. rockefeller: madam president, i ask unanimous consent to speak in a seated position. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. rockefeller: madam president, i come to the floor to wholly support the comments of my colleagues, the senator from california and the senator from arizona, to speak about a matter of great
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importance to me personally but more importantly, to the country. the senate intelligence committee's study of the detention program, i'll just call it the program, is the most in-depth, the most substantive oversight initiative the committee has ever undertaken. i doubt any committee has done more than this. it presents freely extremely valuable insight into the problems that need to be addressed by the c.i.a. moreover, the study exemplifies why this committee was created in the first place following the findings of the church committee nearly 40 years ago. and i commend my friend and the committee's leader, the senator from california, for shepherding this landmark initiative to this point. for years often behind closed doors and without any recognition, she has been a strong and tireless advocate and she deserves our thanks and recognition. it is my hope and expectation
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that beyond the initial release of the executive summary and findings and conclusions that the entire 6,800-page, 37,000 footnotes will eventually be made public and i'm sure it will with the appropriate redactions. those public findings will be critical to fully learning the necessary lessons from this dark episode in our nation's history and to ensuring it never happens again. it has been a very long, very hard fight to get to this point. especially in the early years the c.i.a.'s detention program, it was a struggle for the committee to get the most basic information or any information at all about the program. the committee's study of the detention program is not just a story of the brutal and ill conceived program itself. the study is also the story of a breakdown in our system, madam president, of governance that allowed a country to
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deviate in such a significant and horrific way from our core principles. one of the profound ways that the breakdown happened was through the active subversion of meaningful congressional oversight. a theme mirrored in the bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program during that period. i first learned about some aspects of the c.i.a.'s attention and interrogation program in 2003. when i became vice chair of the committee at that point and for years after, the c.i.a. refused to provide me or anybody else with any additional information about the program. they further refused to notify the full committee about the program's existence. you remember, there was always the gang of four, the gang of six or the gang of eight. they'd take the chairman or vice chairman, take them to the without, 45 minutes with the vice president and off we go.
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senator roberts and i went down by car and were instructed we couldn't talk to each other on the way back from one of those meetings. it was absurd. they refused to do anything to be of assistance. the briefings i received offered little or no insight into the c.i.a.'s programs. followups were rejected and at times i was not allowed to consult with my counsel. i'm an lawyer. there are legal matters involved here. they said we couldn't talk to any of our staff, legal counsel or not. or other members of the committee. who knew nothing about this because they had not been informed at all. it was clear that these briefings were not meant to answer any questions but were intended only to provide cover for the administration and the c.i.a. it was infuriating to me to realize i was part of a check box exercise that the
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administration planned to use and later did use so they could disingenuously claim that they had -- in a phrase i will never forget -- "fully brief the congress." in the years that followed, i fought and lost many battles to obtain credible information about the detention and interrogation program. as vice chair i tried to launch as has been mentioned a comprehensive investigation into the program but that effort was blocked. later in 2005, when i fought for over 100 specific documents in the c.i.a. report, the c.i.a. refused to cooperate. the first time the full senate intelligence committee was given any information about this detention program was september 2006. this was the year after the program -- this was years after the program's inception and the same day that the president informed the nation. the following year when i became
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chairman, the vice-chairman kit bond and i agreed to push for additional access to the program. for heaven's sake, at least allow both the senate and house judiciarinteel generals committe -- intelligence committee to be informed on this. we finally actually prevailed and got this access. i think i withheld something from them until they agreed to do that which enable which enabe much-needed hearings on the program. i made sure we scrutinized it from every angle. the challenge of getting accurate information from the c.i.a. persisted. it was during this period that the house and senate considered the 2008 intelligence authorization act and a potential provision that set the army field manual as the only way to go, set that a as the
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standard for the entire government. this would have ended the c.i.a.'s interrogation techniques, a term eerily sanitized in bureaucratic jargon for what in many cases amounted to torture. as chairntion i knew the inclusion of the army field manual provision would jeopardize the entire bill. i thought it might bring it down. people would think it was too soft or radical or whatever. which i was dmitte committed tod happen. in the end it was an ease i decision. i supported including the end of the c.i.a.'s program because it was the right thing to do and i did it because congress needed to send a clear signal that it did not stand by the bush administration policy. this is 0 notious going to be a critique of the bush administration, incidentally. the house and senate went on to pass the bill with bipartisan
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votes and although the bush administration vetoed the bill to preserve its ability to continue these practices, it was an important symbolic moment. in the same period i also sent two committee staffers, as our chairwoman, has indicated, to begin to review cables of the c.i.a. regarding the interrogations of dub disub and abd al-rahim al-nashiri. i firmly believed that we had to review those cables which are now the only source of important historical information on this subject because the c.i.a. droid these tapes which they had done of some of their interrogation sessions and they droid those tapes against the explicit direction from the white house and the director of national bell generals. -- intelligence. the investigation i began in 20
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0*8 07 grew under chairman feinstein's dedication and tremendous leadership into a full study of the c.i.a.'s detention interrogation pravment the more the committee dug, the more the committee found. the results they found are shocking and deanly troubling. first, the detention interrogation program was conceived by people who were ignorant of the topic and made it up on the fly, based on the untested theories of contractors who had never met a terrorist or conducted a real-world interrogation of any kind. second, it was executed by personnel with insufficient linguistic and interrogation training and little if any real-world experience. moreover, the c.i.a. was aware that some of these personnel had a staggering array of personal and professional fail ution
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innumerated by the committee's chairwoman, including potentially criminal activity and should have disqualified them immediately, not only from being interrogators but being employed by the c.i.a. or anybody in government. nevertheless, it was consistently represented that these interrogators were professionalized and carefully vetted -- their term -- understand that became part of the hollow legal justification of the entire program. third, the program was managed incompetently by senior officials who paid little or no attention to critical details and it was rife with troubling personal and professional conflicts of interest among a small group of c.i.a. officials and contractors who promoted and defended it. obviously it was in their interest. fourth, it was, as the chairwoman has indicated,
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physically very severe, the program, far more so than any of us outside the c.i.a. ever knew. though waterboardin waterboardid the most attention, there were other techniques that i believe -- one in particular -- that was much worse. finally it's results were unclear at best but it was presented to the white house, the department of justice, to the congress and to the media as a silver bullet to "savings lives." that was their man travment in fact, it did not provide the intelligence it was supposed to provide or that the c.i.a. argumented that it did provide. to be perfectly clear, these harsh techniques were not approved by anyone ever. for the low-bar standard of learning useful information from detainees. these techniques were approved because the administration
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lawyers and first of all, were told and therefore believed that these coercive interrogations were absolutely necessary to elice i think intelligence that was unavailable by any other collection method and would save american lives. it was simply not the case. for me personally, the art of the story comprises more than a decade of my 30 years of work in the senate and one of the hardest fights fights -- i thie hardest fight i've ever been thriewvment many othrough. many of the worst years were in the bush administration. however, i did not fully anticipate how hard these last few years would be -- how hard it would be in this administration to get this summary declassified and to tell
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the full story of what happened. indeed to my great frustration, even after months of negotiations -- endless negotiations -- significant aspects of the story remain obscured by black ink. i have great admiration for the president and i am appreciative of the leadership role he has taken to depart from the practices of the bush administration on these issues. his executive order formally ended the c.i.a.'s detention program practices, and it is a good example. it is a great example. and so it was, therefore, with deep disappointment that over the course of a number of private meetings and conversations came to feel that the white house's trong deferencwhite house's -- strongt throughout this process has at times worked at cross-purposes with the white house's stated interest in transparency and has muddied what should be a clear and unequivocal legacy on this issue.
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while aspiring to be the most transparent administration in history, this white house continues to quietly withhold from the committee more than 9,000 documents related to the c.i.a.'s programs. i don't know why. they won't say. and they won't produce. in addition to strongly supporting the c.i.a.'s insistence on the unprecedented re-daks of fake -- redaction of fake names i in the report, whih obscures's the pubs ability to understand the connections which are so important for weaving together the tap century, the administration also pushed for the redaction of information in the committee study that should not be classified, contradict the administration's own executive order on class dpaismght--classification. that order states that in no case shall information fail to be declassified in order to conceal violations of law,
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inefficiency, or administrative error or prevent embarrassment to a person, to an organization, or to an agency -- close quote. in some stains, the -- in some instances, the white house asked not only that information be redacted but that the redaction itself be removed so that it would be impossible for the readers to tell something that was already hidden. strange. given that, looking back, i am deeply dapted rather than priced that even -- rather than surprised that even when the c.i.a. conducted an unauthorized search of the committee's computer files at an offsite facility which were potentially criminal and even when it became clear that the intent of the search was to suppress the committee's awareness of an internal c.i.a. document and review that corroborated parts of the intelligence committee's
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study and contradicted the public c.i.a. statement, the white house continued to support the c.i.a. leadership, and that support was unflinching. despite these frustrations, i've also seen how hard chairman feinstein has fought against great odds, stubborn odds, protective odds, mysterious odds, which are not really clear to me. i've raid to support her thoughtful and determined efforts at every opportunity to make huer as much of the story can be told as possible, and i'm deeply proud of the product that the committee ended up with. now it's time to move forward. for all of the misinformation, incompetence, and brutality in the c.i.a.'s prarnlg the committee study is not and must the senate is not in order simply backward-looking condemnation of the past. the study presents a tremendous opportunity to develop
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forward-looking lessons that must be central to all future activities. the point has been made -- and i thothoroughly agree with it that the vast majority of people that work at the c.i.a. do very good work and are working very hard and have absolutely nothing to do with any of this. but if this report had not been released, the kurn would have felt that everybody at the c.i.a. and the world would have felt that everybody at the c.i.a. was involved in this program, so it's foreign say that that was not the case. it was just 30 or 40 people at the top. many of the people that you see on television blasting this report were intimately involved in carrying it out and setting it up. the c.i.a. developed the detention program in a time of great fear and aing diet -- unprecedented crisis. but it is at these times of crisis when we need sound judgment, excellence, and
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professionalism from the c.i.a. the most. when mistakes are made, they call for self-reflection and scrutiny, without process to begin, we first have to make sure there is an absolute accurate public record of what happened. that we are continuing to do. the public release of the executive summary and findings and conclusions is a tremendous and consequential step towards that end. from some i suspect there will be the temptation, the fact to leeject, to cast doubt, to trivialize, to attack, or rationalize parts of the study that are disturbing or are embarrassing. indeed, the c.i.a.' c.i.a.'s prs divergent from the standards that we hold ourselves is hard to reconcile. however, we must fight that sure-sighted temptation to wish away the gravity of what this study found.
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how we deal with this opportunity to learn to improve will reflect on the maturity of our democracy. as a country, we are strong enough to bear what -- the weight of what the i mistakes we have maivmentd so is the central intelligence agency. we must confront this dark period in our recent history with honesty and critical intertrough specks. we must draw lessons, apply those slowness as we move forward. although it might be uncomfortable at times, we will grow strong and ensure that this never happens again. i thank the presiding officer and yield the floor. mrs. feinstein: madam chair wornlings i know the time for caucus is approaching and i know there are other members on the democratic side that want to speak and it is now time for a member from the republican side. i'm going to ask unanimous
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consent that the recess be delayed for five minutes so that the distinguished senator from south carolina might speak. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. graham: senator begich, do you need to go ahead? are you sure? the presiding officer: is there objection? the senator from south carolina. mr. graham: thank you very much, madam chairman. i've been a military lawyer for over 30 years. it's been one of the highlights of my life to serve in the air force and during the debate about these techniques i was very proud of the fact that every military lawyer came out on the side that the techniques in question were not who we are and what we want to be. we are one of the leading voices of the geneva convention. we have stood by the geneva convention since its interception, and i am convinced
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that the techniques in question violate the geneva convention, and i'm also convinced that they were motivated by fear, fear of another attack. put yourself in the shoes of the people responsible for defending the country right after 9/11. we've been hit, we've been hit hard and everybody thought something else was coming. as we rounded these guys up, there was a sense of urgency and a commitment to never let it happen again that generated this program. who knew what, when? i don't know. all i can tell you is that the people involved believed they were trying to defend the country and what they were doing was necessary. did they get some good information? probably so. has it been a net loser for us as a country? absolutely so. all i can say is that the
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techniques in question were motivated by fear of another attack and people at the time thought this was the best way to defend the nation. i accept that on their part. but as a nation, i hope we have learned the following: that in this ideological struggle, good versus evil, we need to choose good. there is no shortage of people who will cut your heads off, and the techniques in question are nowhere near what the enemies of this nation and radical islam would do to people under their control. there is no comparison. the comparison is between who we are and what we want to be. in that regard, we made a mistake. no one is going to jail because they should not, because the laws in question, the laws that existed at the time of this program were, to be generous,
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vague. so i spent about a year of my life with senator mccain working with the bush dimed and colleagues -- the bush dimed and colleagues on the democratic side to come up with the treaty act which puts people on notice what you can and what you can't do. going forward we fix this problem. how do you know it's a problem? i travel. i go to the mideast a lot, i go all over the world and it was a problem for us. whether we like it or not we're seen as the good guys. i like it. and sometimes good people make mistakes. we have corrected the problem. we have interrogation techniques now that i think can protect the nation and live within our values. the one thing i want to stress to my colleagues is that this is a war of an ideological nature. we're not going to take tokyo and we're not going to take berlin. there is no air force to shoot down.
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there is no navy to sink. you're fighting a radical extreme ideology motivated by hate, and in their world if you don't agree with their religion, you're no longer a human being. the only way we can possibly defeat this ideology is to offer something better. the good news for us is that we stand for something better. we stand for due process. we stand for humane treatment. we stand for the ability to have a say when you're accused of something. our enemies stand for none of that. that is their greatest weakness. and our greatest strength is to offer a better way. and when you go to anbar province and when you go to other places in the mideast that have experienced life under isis, isil and al qaeda, the reaction has almost been universal: we don't like this.
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and when america comes over the hill and they see that flag, they know help is on the way. to the c.i.a. officers who serve in the shadows, who intermingle with the most notorious in the world, who are always away from home, never knowing if you're going back, thank you. there is a debate about is this report accurate line by line. i don't know. is this the definitive answer to the program's problems? i don't know. but i do know the program hurt our country, and those days are behind us. and the good guys aired their did ity laundry. i -- dirty laundry. i wish we waited because i do fear this report will be used by our enemies. but i guess there is no good time to do things like this.
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so to those who helped prepare the report, i understand where you're coming from. to those on my side who believe that we're going too far, i understand that too. but this has always been easy for me. i've been too associated with the subject matter for too long. every time our nation cuts a corner and every time we act out of fear and abandon who we are, we always regret it. that's happened forever. this is a step toward righting a wrong. to our enemies, take no comfort from the fact that we've changed our program. we're committed to your demise. we're committed to your incarceration and killing you on the battlefield if necessary. to our friends, because we choose a different path don't
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mistake that for weakness. what we're doing today is not a sign of weakness. it is a sign of the ultimate strength. that you can self-correct, that you can reevaluate, and you can do some soul-searching, and you can come out with a better product. the tools available to our intelligence community today over time will yield better results, more reliable results. the example we're setting will over time change the world, because to defeat radical schaim, you have -- to defeat radical islam you have to show separation. today is a commitment to show separation. and the techniques that they employ to impose their will have been used for thousands of years. and they're always over time rejected. the values that we stand for --
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tolerance, humane treatment of everyone, whether you agree with them or not -- has also stood the test of time. and over time we will win and they will lose. and today is about making that time period shorter, because the sooner america can reattach herself to who she is, the worse off the enemy will be. thank you. i yield. the presiding officer: the senator from alaska. mr. begich: i ask unanimous consent that the senate proceed to immediate consideration of calendar number 534, senate 1474. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: calendar number 534, s. 1474, a bill to encourage the state of alaska to enter into intergovernmental agreements with indian tribes,
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and so forth and for other purposes. the presiding officer: is there objection to proceeding? without objection. mr. begich: i further ask the comt reported substitute amendment withdrawn, the begich amend be agreed to, the bill as amended be read a third time and passed, the title amendment with it at the desk be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be considered, made and laid on the table with no intervening action or debate. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection. mr. begich: madam president, i have seven unanimous consent requests for committees to meet during today's session of the senate. they have the approval of the majority and minority leaders. i ask unanimous consent that these requests be agreed to and that these requests be printed in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. begich: i yield the floor. the presiding officer: under the previous order -- the senator from rhode island. mr. whitehouse: madam chair, while chairman feinstein and chairman rockefeller are still here on the floor, may i just take a moment to thank them for the work that they did on this
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report. i am very proud of the moral certainty and leadership that both chairman rockefeller and chairman feinstein showed. it was, as they know better than i, through many troubles, toils and snares that this report was able to be produced. and i could not be happier that we were able to make it public while senator rockefeller remains a member of this body and has the chance to participate in this. and i would join chairman feinstein in thanking the exceptional work of the intelligence committee staff: david, dan, alyssa who is not with us any longer. i thank you for mentioning andrew grotto, my staff member related on this report. i feel we have done a very good thing here, and i appreciate very much, particularly senator mccain coming forward. he brings a unique moral
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perspective and force to this conversation, and he has wielded that moral perspective and force with great courage. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate the previous order, the senate >> well, the senate is in recess now few their weekly party lunches. lawmakers due back early this afternoon for possibly more about the senate report on cia interrogations and tributes to retiring members. two confirmation votes both on the tennessee valley authority at 6 p.m. off the floor members continue working on a bill to fund the government passed thursday when money runs out. before going out, senators commented on the intelligence committee's report on the release of cia interrogations and begins with committee chair dianne feinstein. >> mr. president, this has been
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a long process. the work began seven years ago when senator rockefeller directed committee staff to review the ci cables, cia cables describing the interrogation sessions of sa bay da and nasiri. i believe the documentation and the findings' conclusions will make clear how this program was morally, legally and administratively misguided and that this nation should never again engage in these tactics. let me now turn to the contents of the study. as i noted, we have 20 findings and conclusions which fall into four general categories. first, the cia's enhanced interrogation techniques were not an effective way to gather intelligence information. second, the cia provided extensive amounts of inaccurate
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information about the operation of the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the cia inspector general, the media and the american public. third, the cia's management of the program was inadequate and deeply flawed. and, fourth, the cia program was far more brutal than people were led to believe. let me describe each category in more detail. the first set of findings and conclusions concern the effectiveness or lack thereof of the interrogation program. the committee found that the cia's coercive interrogation techniques were not an effective means of acquiring accurate intelligence or gaining detainee cooperation. the cia and other defenders of the program have repeatedly
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claimed that the use of so-called interrogation techniques was necessary to get detainees to provide critical information and to bring detainees to a, quote, state of compliance, end quote, in which they would cooperate and provide information. the study concludes that both claims are inaccurate. the report is very specific in how it evaluates the cia's claims on the effectiveness and necessity of its enhanced interrogation techniques. specifically, we use the cia's own definition of effectiveness as ratified and approved by the department of justice's office of legal counsel. the cia's claims that the eits were necessary to obtain, quote,
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otherwise available, end quote, information that could not be obtained from any other source to stop terrorist attacks and save american lives, that's a claim we conclude is inaccurate. we took 20 examples that the cia itself claimed to show the success of these interrogations. these include cases of terrorist plots stopped or terrorists captured. the cia used these examples in presentations to the white house, in testimony to congress, in submissions to the department of justice and, ultimately, to the american people. some of the claims are well known, the capture of khalid
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sheikh mohammed and the takedown of osama bin laden. other claims were made only in classified settings to the white house, congress and department of justice. in each case the cia claimed that critical and unique information came from one or more detainees in its custody after they were subjected to the cia's coercive techniques, and that information led to specific counterterrorism success. our staff reviewed every one of the 20 cases, and not a single case holds up. in every single one of these cases, at least one of the following was true: one, the intelligence community had information separate from the use of eits that led to the terrorist disruption or capture,
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two, information from a detainee subjected to eits played no role in the claimed disruption or capture and, three, the purported terrorist plot either did not exist or posed no real threat to americans or united states interests. some critics have suggested the study concludes that no intelligence was ever provided from any detainee the cia held. that is false, and the study makes no such claim. what is true is that actionable intelligence that was, quote, otherwise unavailable, otherwise unavailable was not obtained using these coercive interrogation techniques. the report also chronicles where the use of interrogation techniques do not involve physical force were effective.
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specifically, the report provides examples where interrogators had sufficient information to confront detainees with facts, know when they were lying and when they apply -- where they applied rapport-building techniques that were honed by the united states military, the fbi and more recently the interagency high value detainee interrogation group called the hague, that these techniques produced good intelligence. let me make a couple of additional comments on the claimed effectiveness of cia interrogations. at no time did the cia's coercive interrogation techniques lead to the collection of intelligence on an imminent threat that many believe was the justification for the use of these techniques. the committee never found an
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example of this hypothetical ticking time bomb scenario. the use of coercive technique methods regularly resulted in fabricated information. sometimes the cia actually knew detainees were lying. other times the cia acted on false information, diverting resources and leading officers or contractors to falsely believe they were acquiring unique or actionable intelligence and that its interrogations were working when they were not.
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the cia provided extensive, inaccurate information about the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the cia inspector general, the media and the american public. this conclusion is somewhat personal for me. i remember clearly when director hayden briefed the intelligence committee for the first time on the so-called eits at that september 2006 committee meeting. he referred specifically to a, quote, tummy slap, end quote, among other techniques and presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful
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and implied in a highly clinical and professional manner. they were not. the committee's a report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful and that the constraints that existed on paper in washington did not match the way techniques were used at cia sites around the world. of particular note was the treatment of abu saw buy da over 17 days in august 2002. this involved nonstop interrogation and abuse 24/7 and included multiple forms of deprivation and physical assault. the description of this period, first written up by our staff in early 2009 while senator rockefeller was chairman, is
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what prompted this full review. the cia provided inaccurate memoranda and explanations to the department of justice while its legal counsel was considering the legality of the coercive techniques. in those communications to the department of justice, the cia claimed the following: the coercive techniques would not be used with excessive repetition, detainees would always have an opportunity to provide information prior to the use of the techniques, the techniques were to be used in progression, starting with the least aggressive and proceeding only if needed, medical personnel would make sure that interrogations wouldn't cause serious harm, and they could intervene at any time to stop
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interrogations, investigation interrogators were carefully vetted and highly trained, and each technique was to be used in a specific way without deviation. and only with specific approval for the interrogator and detainee involved. none of these assurances which the department of justice relied on to form its legal opinions were consistently or even routinely carried out. for example, foreign intelligence committee chairman bob graham asked a number of questions after he was first briefed in september of 2002, but the cia refused to answer him, effectively stonewalling
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him until he left the committee at the end of the year. in another example, the cia -- in coordination with white house officials and staff -- initially withheld information of the cia's interrogation it can anemics from secretary -- techniques from secretary of state colin powell and secretary of defense donald rumsfeld. there are cia records stating that colin powell wasn't told about the program at first because there were concerns that, and i quote, powell would blow his stack if he were briefed. source e-mail from john riso dated july 31, 2003. cia records clearly indicate, and definitively, that after he was briefed on the cia's first detainee, abu zubaydah, the cia
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didn't tell president bush about the full nature of the eits until april 2006. that's what the records indicate. the cia similarly withheld information or provided false information to the cia inspector general during his can conduct of -- his conduct of a special review by the ig in 2004. incomplete and inaccurate information from the cia was used in documents provided to the department of justice and as a basis for president bush's speech on september 6, 2006, in which he publicly acknowledged the cia program for the first time. in all of these cases, other cia officers acknowledged internally -- they acknowledged internally -- that information the cia had provided was wrong. the cia also misled other
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cia/white house officials. when vice president cheney's counsel, david addington, ex-cia counsel scott muller in 2003 about the cia's videotaping the waterboarding of detainees, muller deliberately told him that videotapes, quote, were not being made, end quote. but did not disclose that videotapes of previous waterboarding sessions had been made and still existed. source: e-mail from scott muller dated june 7, 2003. there are many, many more examples in the committee's report. all are documented. the third set of findings and conclusions notes the various ways in which cia management of the detention and interrogation program from its inception to its formal termination in january of '09 was inadequate and deeply flawed.
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there is no doubt that the detention and interrogation program was, by any measure, a major cia undertaking. it raised significant legal and policy issues and involved significant resources and funding. it was not, however, managed as a significant cia program. instead, it had limited oversight and lacked formal direction and management. for example, in the six months between being granted detention authority and taking custody of its first detainee, abu zubaydah, the cia had not identified and prepared a suitable detention site, it had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques outside of the rapport-building
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techniques that were official cia policy until that time. in fact, there is no indication the cia reviewed its own history. that's just what helgerson was saying in '05 with coercive interrogation tactics. as the executive summary notes, the cia had engaged in rough interrogation in the past. in fact, the cia had previously sent a letter to the intelligence committee in 1989, and here is the quote, that inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers, end quote. that was a letter from john helgerson, cia director of congressional affairs, dated january 8th, 1989.
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however, in late 2001 and '2 rather than research interrogation practices and coordinate with other parts of the government with extensive expertise in detention and interrogation of terrorist attacks, the cia engaged two contract psychologists who had never conducted interrogations themselves or ever operated detention facilities. as the cia captured or received custody of detainees through 2002, it maintained separate lines of management at headquarters for different detention facilities. no individual or office was in charge of the detention and interrogation program until january of 2003 by which point more than one-third of cia
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detainees identified in our review had been detained and interrogated. one clear example of flawed cia management was the poorly-managed detention facility referred to in our report by the code name cobalt to hide the actual name of the facility. it began operations in september of 2002. the facility knew few formal records of the detainees -- excuse me, the facility kept few formal records of the detainees housed there, and untrained cia officers conducted frequent, unauthorized and unsupervised interrogations using the ec anemics that were not -- techniques that were not and never became part of the cia's formal enhanced interrogation
quote
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program. finish the cia -- the cia placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of the site. in november 2002 an otherwise healthy detainee who was being held mostly nude and chained to a concrete floor died at the facility from what is believed to have been hypothermia. in interviews conducted in 2003 by the cia officer of the inspector general, cia's leadership acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at this specific cia detention site. and some cia officials, excuse me, senior officials believed erroneously that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used there. the cia in its june 2013 response to the committee's report agreed that there were management failures in the
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program but asserted that they were corrected by early 2003. while the study found that management failures improved somewhat, we found they persisted til the end of the program. among the numerous management shortcomings identified in the report are the following: the cia used poorly-trained and nonvetted personnel, individuals were deployed -- in particular, interrogators -- without relevant training or experience. due to the redactions in the report, there are limits to what i can say in this regard, but it's a clear fact that the cia deployed officers who had histories of person, ethical and professional problems of a serious nature. these included histories of violation and abusive treatment of others and should have called
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into question their employment with the united states government, let alone their suitability to participate in a sensitive cia covert action program. the two contractors that cia allowed to develop, operate and assess its interrogation operations conducted numerous, inherently governmental functions that never should have been outsourced to contractors. these contractors are referred in the report in special pseudonyms; >> wieg earth and dunbar. they developed the list of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that the cia employed. they personally conducted interrogations of some of the cia's most significant detainees using the techniques, including the waterboarding, of abu
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zubaydah, khalid sheikh mohammed and al-nashiri. the contractors provided the official evaluations of whether detainees' psychological states allowed for the continued use of the enhanced techniques. even for some detainees they themselves were interrogating or had interrogated. evaluating the psychological state of the very detainees they were interrogating is a clear conflict of interest and a violation of professional guidelines. the cia relied on these two contractors to evaluate the interrogation program they had devised and in which they had obvious financial interests; again, a clear conflict of interest and an avoidance of responsibility by the cia. in 2005 the two contractors formed a company specifically for the purpose of expanding their work with the cia.
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from '05 to '08, cia outsourced almost all aspects of its detention and interrogation program to this country as part of a contract valued at more than $180 million. ultimately, not all contract options were exercised. however, the cia has paid these two contractors and their company more than $80 million. of the 119 individuals found to have been detained by the cia during the life of the program, the committee found that at least are 26 were wrongfully held. these are cases where the cia itself determined that it had not met the standard for detention set out in the 2001 memorandum of notification which
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governs a covert action. detainees often remained in custody for months after the cia determined they should have been released. cia records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees. due to poor recordkeeping, a full accounting of how many specific detainees were held and how they were specifically treated while in custody may never be known. similarly, in specific instances we found that enhanced interrogation techniques were used without authorization in a manner far different and more brutal than had been authorized by the office of legal counsel and conducted by personnel not approved to use them on detainees. questions about how and when to apply interrogation techniques
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were ad hoc and not proposed, evaluated and approved in the manner described by the cia in written descriptions and testimony about the program. detainees were often subject to harsh and brutal interrogation and treatment because cia analysts believe often in error that they knew more information than what they had provided. sometimes cia managers and interrogators in the field were uncomfortable with what they were being asked to do and recommended ending the abuse of a detainee. repeatedly, in such cases, they were overruled by people at cia headquarters who thought they knew better such as by analysts with no line authority. this shows again how a relatively small number of cia
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personnel, perhaps 40-50, were making decisions on detention and interrogation despite the better judgments of other cia officers. the fourth and final set of findings and conclusions concern how the interrogations of cia detainees were absolutely brutal, far worse than the cia represented them to policymakers and others. beginning with the first detainee, abu zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the cia applied its so-called enhanced interrogation techniques in combination and in near-stop fashion for days and even weeks at a time on one detainee. in contrast, the cia representations, detainees were subjected to the most aggressive
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techniques immediately; stripped naked, diapered, physically struck and put in various stressful positions for long periods of time. they were deprived of sleep for days, in one case up to 180 hours. that's seven and a half days over a week with no sleep. usually standing or in stressed positions, at times with their hands tied together over their heads, chained to the ceiling. in the cobalt facility i previously mentioned, interrogators and guards used what they called rough takedowns in which a detainee was grabbed from his cell, clothes cut off, hooded and dragged up and down a dirt hallway while being slapped and punched. the cia led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave cia custody alive, suggesting to abu zubaydah that he would only
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leave in a coffin-shaped box, that's a cia cable from august 12, 2002. according to another cia cable, cia officers also planned to cremate zubaydah should he not survive his interrogation. source: cia cable, july 15, 2002. after the news and photographs emerged from the united states military detention of iraqis at abu ghraib, the intelligence committee held a hearing on the matter on may 12, 2004. without disclosing any details of its own interrogation program, cia director john mclaughlin testified that cia interrogations were nothing like what was depicted at abu ghraib, the united states prison in iraq where detainees were abused by american personnel. this, of course, was false.
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cia detainees at one facility, described as a dungeon, were kept in complete darkness, constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. the u.s. bureau of prisons personnel went to that location in november 2002, and according to a contemporaneous internal cia e-mail, told cia officers they had, quote, never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, end quote. again source: cia e-mail, sender and recipient redacted, december 5, 2002. throughout the program multiple cia detainees, subject to interrogation, exhibited psychological and behavioral issues including hallucinations, paranow ya, insomnia and
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attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. multiple cia psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems. the executive summary includes far more detail than i'm going to provide here about things that were in these interrogation sessions, and the summary itself includes only a subset of the treatment of the 119 cia detainees. there is far more detail -- all documented -- in the full 6,700-page study. this summarizes briefly the committee's findings and conclusions. before i wrap up, i'd like to thank the people who made this undertaking possible. first, i thank senator jay rockefeller. he started this project by directing his staff to review
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the operational cables that describe the first recorded interrogations after we learned that the videotapes of those sessions had been destroyed. and that report was what head to this multi-year investigation, and without it we wouldn't have really had any sense of what had happened. i thank other members of the senate intelligence committee, one of whom is on the floor today from the great state of new mexico, others have been on the floor who voted to conduct this investigation and to approve its results and make the report public. but most importantly, i want to thank the intelligence committee staff who performed this work. they are dedicated and committed public officials who sacrificed and really sacrificed a
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significant portion of their lives to see this report through to its publication. they have worked days, nights, weekends for years in some of the most difficult circumstances. it's no secret to anyone that the cia does not want this report coming out, and i believe the nation owes them a debt of gratitude. they are dan jones, who has led this review since 2007, and more than anyone else, today is a result of his effort. evan -- [inaudible] and chad turner, two other members of the study staff. each wrote thousands of pages of the full report and have dedicated themselves and much of their lives to this project. alyssa starzak who contributed extensively until her departure from the committee in 2011.
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other key contributors to the drafting, editing and review of the report were jennifer barrett, nick -- [inaudible] mike buchwald, jim cotell la, eric chapman, john -- [inaudible] lorenzo -- [inaudible] andrew grotto, test saw -- [inaudible] michael noblitt, michael pesner, tommy ross, caroline -- [inaudible] and james wolfe. and finally, david grannis who has been a never-faltering staff director throughout this review. madam president, this study is bigger than the actions of the cia. it's really about american values and morals. it's about the constitution, the bill of rights, our rule of law. these values exist regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. they exist in peacetime and in
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wartime. and if we cast aside these values when convenient, we have failed to live by the very precepts that make our nation a great one. there's a reason why we carry the banner of a great and just nation, so we submit this study on behalf of the committee to the public in the belief that it will stand the test of time, and with it the report will carry the message: never again. i very much appreciate your attention, and i yield to senator mccain. >> plaid dam president -- madam president, i would like to begin by expressing my appreciation and admiration for the hen and women who serve -- for the member and women who serve in our intelligence agencies including the cia. they are out there every day defending the nation. i have read the executive summary, and i also have been briefed on the entirety of this report.
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i rise in support of the release, the long-delayed release, of the senate intelligence committee's summarized, unclassified review of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were employed by the previous administration to extract information from captured terrorists. it's a thorough and thoughtful study of practices that i believe not only failed their purpose to secure actionable intelligence to prevent further attacks on the u.s. and our allies, but actually damaged our security interests as well as our reputation as a force for good in the world. i believe the american people have a right, indeed respondent, to know -- responsibility, to know what was done this their name, how these practices did or did not serve our interests and how they comported with our most important values.
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i commend chairwoman feinstein and her staff for their diligence in seeking a truthful accounting of policies i hope we will never resort to again. i thank them for persevering against persistent opposition from many members of the intelligence community, from officials in two administrations and from some of our colleagues. the truth is sometimes a hard pill to swallow. it sometimes causes us difficulties at home and abroad. it is sometimes used by our enemies in attempts to hurt us. but the american people are entitled to it, none theless. nonetheless. they must know when the values that define our nation are intentionally disregarded by our security policies, even those policies that are conducted in secret, they must be able to
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make informed judgments about whether those policies and the personnel who supported them were justified in compromising our values, whether they served a greater good or whether, as i believe, they stained our national honor, did much harm and little practical good. what were the policies? what was their purpose? did they achieve it? did they make us safer? less safe? or did they make no difference? what did they gain us? what did they cost us? the metropolitan people need the answers to these questions. yes, some things must be kept from public disclosure to protect clandestine operations, sources and methods, but not the answers to these questions. by providing them, the committee has empowered the american people to come to their own
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decisions about whether we should have employed such practices in the past and whether we should consider permitting them in the future. this report strengthens self-government and ultimately, i believe, america's security and stature in the world, and i thank the committee for that valuable public service. i have long believed some of these practices amounted to torture as a reasonable person would define it, especially but not only the practice of waterboarding which is a mock execution and an exquisite form of torture. its use is shameful and unnecessary, and contrary to assertions made by some of its defenders and as the committee's report makes clear, it produced little useful intelligence to help us track down the perpetrators of 9/11 or prevent new attacks and atoss the cities.
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atrocities. i know from personal experience that the abuse of prisoners produce more bad than good intelligence. i know that victims of torture will offer intentionally-misleading information if they think their captors will believe it. i know they will say whatever they think their torturers want them to say if they believe it will stop their suffering. most of all, i know the use of torture compromises that which most distinguishes us from our enemies; our belief that all people, even captured enemies, possess basic human rights which are protected by international conventions the united states not only joined, but for the most part authored. i know, too, that bad things happen in war. i know in war good people can feel obliged for good reasons to do things they would normally
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object to and recoil from. i understand the reasons that governed the decision to resort to these interrogation methods. and i know that those who approved them and those who used them were dedicated to securing justice for the victims of terrorist attacks and to protect americans from further harm. i know their responsibilities for grave and urgent -- were grave and urgent, and the strain of their duty was onerous. i respect their dedication and appreciate their dilemma. but i dispute wholeheartedly that it was right for them to use these methods which this report makes clear were neither in the best interests of justice, nor our security, nor the ideals we have sacrificed so much blood and treasure to defend. the knowledge of torture's
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dubious efficacy and my moral objection to the abuse of prisoners motivated by sponsorship of the detown knee treatment act -- detainee treatment act of 2005 which prohibits, quote, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of captured combatants whether they wear a nation's uniform or not and which passed the senate by a vote of 90-9. subsequently, i successfully offered amendments to the military commissions act of 2006 which, among other things, prevented the attempt to weaken common article iii of the geneva conventions and broadened definition in thes in the war crimes -- definitions in the war crimes act to make the future use of waterboarding and other, quote, enhanced interrogation techniques punishable as war crimes. there was considerable misinformation disseminated then about what was and wasn't achieved using these methods in an effort to discourage support for the legislation.
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there was a good amount of misinformation used in 2011 to credit the use of methods with the death of osama bin laden, and there is, i fear, misinformation being used today to prevent the release of this report, disputing its findings and warning about the security consequences of their public disclosure. with the report's release, will the report's release cause outrage that leads to violence in some parts of the muslim world? yes, i suppose that's possible, perhaps likely. sadly, violence needs little incentive in some quarters of the world today. but that doesn't mean we will be telling the world something it will be shocked to learn. the entire world already knows that we waterboarded prisoners. it knows we subjected prisoners to various other types of degrading treatment. it knows we used black sites,
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secret prisons. those practices haven't been a secret for a decade. terrorists might use the report's reidentification of the practices as an excuse to attack americans, but they hardly need an excuse for that. that has been their life's calling for a while now. what might cause a surprise not just to our enemies, but to many americans is how little these practices did to aid our efforts to bring 9/11 culprits to justice and to find and prevent terrorist attacks today and tomorrow. that could be a real surprise since it contradicts the many assurances provided by intelligence officials on the record and in private that enhanced interrogation techniques were indispensable in the war against terrorism. and i suspect the objection of those same officials to the release of this report is really focused on that disclosure;
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torture's ineffectiveness. because we gave up much in the expectation that torture would make us safer. too much. obviously, we need intelligence to defeat our enemies, but we need reliable intelligence. torture produces more misleading information than actionable intelligence. and what the advocates of harsh and cruel interrogation methods have never established is that we couldn't have gathered as good or more reliable intelligence from using humane methods. the most important lead we got in the search for osama bin laden came from conventional interrogation methods. i think it's an insult to the many intelligence officers who have acquired good intelligence without hurting or degrading suspects.
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yes, we can and we will. but in the end, torture's failure to serve its intended purpose isn't the main reason to oppose its use. i have often said and will always maintain that this question isn't about our enemies, it's about us. it's about who we were, who we are and who we aspire to be. it's about how we represent ourselves to the world. we have made our way in this often dangerous and cruel world not by just strictly pursuing our geopolitical interests, but by exemplifying our political values and influencing other nations to embrace them. when we fight to defend our security, we fight also for an idea. not for a tribe or a twisted interpretation of an ancient religion or for a king, but for an idea that all men are endowed by their creator with
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inalienable rights. how much safer the world would be if all nations believed the same. how much more dangerous it can become when we forget it ourselves, even momentarily. our enemies act without conscience. we must not. this executive summary of the committee's report makes clear that acting without conscience isn't necessary. it isn't even helpful in winning this strange and long war we're fighting. we should be grateful to have that truth affirmed. now, let us reassert the contrary proposition that it is essential to our success in this war with that we ask those who fight it for us to remember at all times that they are defending a sacred ideal of how nations should be governed and
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conduct their relations with others, even our enemies. those of us who give them this duty are obliged by history, by our nation's highest ideals and the many terrible sacrifices made to protect them, by our respect for human dignity. to make clear, we need not risk our national honor to prevail in this or any war. we need only remember in the worst of times through the chaos and terror of war when facing cruelty, suffering and loss that we are always americans and different, stronger and better than those who would destroy us. madam president, i yield the floor. >> senator from west virginia. >> madam president, i ask unanimous consent to speak in a
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seated position. >> without objection. >> madam president, i come to the floor to wholly support the comments of my colleagues, the senator from california and the senator from arizona, to speak about a matter of great importance to me -- >> you can see senator rockefeller's speech and all of the morning floor speeches on cia interrogations and the report released today as well as read that release and the report at our web site, c-span.org. we'll leave this now, take you live to the senate floor as they gavel back in.

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